This paper analyses the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in the context of optimal policy rules. The transmission mechanism is represented by a linearized rational expectations model augmented for the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. Stabilization objectives are represented by a discounted quadratic loss function penalizing inflation and output gap volatility. Asset prices are allowed to deviate from their intrinsic value since they may be positively affected by past price changes. We find that in the presence of wealth effects and inefficient markets, asset price misalignments from their fundamentals should be included in the optimal interest rate reaction function.
Introduction
Over the last twenty years, significant changes have occurred in the institutional and macroeconomic framework that central banks operate. In particular, there has been a widespread move towards financial liberalization, both within and across national borders, especially after the 1980s, while inflation rates have become lower and less variable. The disinflation process of the 1990s has been a global phenomenon since it is observed both in countries where formal inflation targets are in use, and in non-targeting countries 1 . The decline in inflation has gone hand in hand with a similar decline in interest rates. In many countries, both short term and long term interest rates are close to, or even bellow, post-war lows. As Bean (2003) argues, price stability has not been achieved at the expense of the real economy, as unemployment has been decreasing in a number of countries, while growth has also been relatively stable. Despite the good macroeconomic record of the past decade, there has been a growing concern among academics and policymakers that the achievement of price stability may be associated with an increased risk of financial instability.
Some commentators claim that the lower cost of capital along with exuberant growth projections have boosted the late 1990s stock market bubble. For instance, Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that booms and busts in asset prices should be considered as part of a broader set of symptoms that typically also include a build-up of debt and high rate of capital accumulation.
Rising asset prices and debt accumulation lead to stretched household and corporate balance sheets, vulnerable to sharp corrections of the type witnessed recently in global equity markets. In a series of articles, Hofmann (2000, 2003) establish empirically the link between output growth, credit aggregates, and asset price movements in a number of major economies. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a theoretical model that exhibits a crucial interaction between collateral values, asset prices, credit and economic activity. During the period of boom, balance sheets may look healthy as the increase in asset prices, and consequently the value of the collateral, offsets the build-up of debt. However, when optimism about further increases in asset values turns to pessimism, leading to a decrease in the net worth of households and firms, then financial distress may be the result of financial imbalances unwinding. It has been argued that the widespread financial deregulation of asset markets may have contributed to an increase in the frequency of such boom-bust episodes (IMF, 2003 ).
An important issue related to the above concerns is the establishment of the appropriate monetary policy response to asset price movements. Should the central bank care about the financial instability associated with large asset price fluctuations? Nowadays, everyone recognizes price level stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. Indeed, as Issing (2003) 1 See e.g. Johnson (2002) for international evidence. 2 For instance, Alan Greenspan (2002) argues that: "The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we...need to focus on policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion."
A number of studies have tried to provide an answer to the question of whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices, by simulating macroeconomic models where aggregate demand is affected by consumption wealth effects and/or investment balance sheet effects. The simulation evidence of Gertler (1999, 2001 ) opts for a reactive monetary policy response since they show that a central bank dedicated to price stability should pay no attention to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes to expected inflation (see also Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002) . On the other hand, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) , and Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2003) find that, in line with the new environment proactive view, overall macroeconomic volatility can be reduced with a (mild) reaction of interest rates to asset price misalignments from fundamentals. Also, recent econometric evidence by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003) for the UK, and Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2003) for UK, US and Japan, suggests that monetary policymakers may use asset prices not only as part of their information set for setting interest rates, but also as elements in their reaction function.
All the aforementioned papers use the assumption that monetary policy is characterised by an augmented Taylor rule, where the nominal interest rate responds positively to inflation, demand pressures, and asset prices. Following the seminal work by Taylor (1993) , feedback rules conditioning the interest rate instrument on current or expected inflation and the output gap have been extensively analysed in both theoretical and empirical literature. Svensson (1997) , Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) among others, show that such a feedback rule is optimal in that it derives from the first order condition for the optimisation of the central bank's objectives 3 . In this paper, we try to shed some more light in the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in the context of optimal policy rules. In essence, we will examine whether there is any 3 One should keep in mind though, that simple instrument rules like the Taylor rule and its variants may not correspond to fully optimal policy in the context of a particular economic model (see e.g. Woodford, 2001) . Also, as Svensson, (2003) argues, no central bank has so far made a commitment to a simple instrument rule like the Taylor rule or variants thereof. In addition, neither has any central bank announced a particular instrument rule as a guideline.
underlying theoretical motivation for the increasingly frequent assumption of an augmented (for asset prices) Taylor rule. To do so, we start from a backward-looking structural macro model where asset prices affect future inflation indirectly, through direct wealth effects on aggregate demand. In our model, market inefficiency implies that asset prices may deviate from their fundamental value due to 'momentum' effects from past asset price changes
The optimality conditions suggest that monetary policy should respond to asset price misalignments from their fundamental value, with the aggressiveness of the response being a positive function of the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. This result has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy and contributes crucially to the existing literature, as previous work on optimal rules considering asset prices, either fails to find a role for asset prices (Bean, 2003) , or obtains complex, non linear rules (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model that will be employed, while section 2.1 focuses on the asset price block of the model and provides econometric evidence to support the chosen specification. In section 2.2 the model is solved, and in section 3 we calculate the optimal interest rate rule based upon dynamic optimization of the central bank's objectives. In section 3.1 we analyze the results with a special interest on the interaction between the magnitude of wealth effects and the interest rate reaction coefficients. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We use a structural backward-looking model of a (closed) economy that allows for the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. The model augments the standard macroeconomic system (aggregate demand, aggregate supply) by taking into account asset prices, which themselves are assumed to stochastically evolve influenced by both fundamentals and momentum. The model is given by the following equations: 
where y t is the deviation of (log) output from its steady-state level (output gap), 
Eq. (1) The demand side, as given by Eq. (2), is consistent with the specification employed by Walsh (1998 ), Ball (1997 ), and Svensson (1997 into account the effect of wealth on aggregate demand, that is, it is fully aware of the effect of q t on y t+1 and its magnitude.
Asset price dynamics
Apart from augmenting aggregate demand to account for the effect of asset prices, our own contribution is to append Eqs. (3) and (4) , and points out that the accelerationist Phillips curve ( 1) can be derived from well-known models of price-setting behavior (see e.g. Roberts, 1995) . 5 As Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) point out, there are good reasons to believe that is not constant. However, the assumption of linearity in the Phillips curve helps to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal feedback rule.
information required to determine the intrinsic asset value will, by actions of rational profitmaximizing agents, be reflected in the actual market price; hence b = 0 and q t = q t * . In the context of the EMH, the asset price changes if and only if the market receives new information about the asset's underlying economic fundamentals, and the actions of speculators are stabilising, in that they drive the actual asset price towards its fundamental value rather than away from it (e.g. by buying underpriced assets and selling overpriced ones).
However, the central tenets of the EMH, that future prices are not affected by past movements in the asset price and that speculation can only have a stabilizing effect have never been quite accepted by market participants. As Kortian (1995) argues, there are several aspects of modern asset markets trading, which are clearly contrary to the sort of behavior implied by the EMH. For instance, the widespread use of technical analysis, that tries to use past asset price movements to predict future prices. Also, the frequent employment of stop-loss orders (selling orders which are activated once the asset price has fallen by a particular pre-determined amount), and the development of dynamic hedging strategies, such as portfolio insurance, according to which, investors buy in a rising market and sell into a falling one. All the aforementioned strategies, base investment decisions upon past price movements and agree with the view that investors from time-to-time act in a destabilizing manner. Economic history also provides plenty examples of destabilizing investor behavior with significant implications for asset prices and aggregate economic activity beginning as early as the seventeenth century 7 .
Incorporating these arguments in our analysis, Eq. (3) indicates that, if asset prices have increased in the past ( q t-1 > 0) there is a positive 'momentum' effect on their current level (b > 0). In essence, investors bid up the demand for asset holdings in expectation that past capital gains will persist in the future. The higher the value of b, the stronger the effect from past asset price changes and therefore q t can diverge significantly from its fundamental value, q t * , albeit not This is supported by the majority of empirical studies examining the effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market 10 . We also allow for uncertainty in the fundamentals' process by including the random disturbance term, u t .
In order to gain some further insight on the suitability and empirical validity of the asset price block of our model, we substituted Eq. (4) in Eq. (3) and took 1 st differences to obtain an econometrically estimatable expression:
where ξ t = ∆u t Eq. (3) implies that real asset returns are negatively related to changes in the real interest rate, and positively affected by (upward) revisions in output expectations, and past asset returns.
Eq. (3) will be estimated using quarterly data for the United Kingdom and the United States over 7 See Garber (2000) for a discussion on the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century as well as other famous bubbles. 8 We do not regard the divergence of q t from q t * as an explicit bubble because we do not assign any probabilistic structure to its evolution. 9 Frenkel and Mussa (1985) argue that a wide range of structural models for exchange rate determination can be subsumed under the reduced form asset price expression: [ Table 1 about here]
The results indicate that, contrary to the EMH, real returns are not only affected by economic fundamentals, but also from their past history since the b coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both UK and USA. The b coefficient obtains values in the range (0,1) ensuring that the dynamic stability criterion in Eq. (3) is satisfied. There is also a negative effect from a monetary policy tightening (-δ 1 = -0.024, -0.016 in UK, USA) and a strong positive effect from higher output (δ 2 = 1,39, 1.54 in UK, USA). Finally, the J-statistics indicate that the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected. 
Solution of the model
Thus, the original system of equations (1-4) can be written compactly in terms of t as: 
Optimal interest rate rule
The central bank objective is to solve the following stochastic control problem: choose an infinite sequence of controls, t , to minimise the expected discounted value of the intertemporal quadratic loss function that penalizes both inflation and output gap volatility: (1) and (2) where 0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output stabilisation. is the discount factor, 0 < <1. In the absence of discounting, the postulated loss function is a weighted average of conditional volatility of inflation and output. It is evident from (2) that at time t, when the interest rate (and consequently t ) is chosen the only state variable is t . Therefore, the value function is defined in terms of t only, V( t ). Applying Bellman's dynamic programming principle, and substituting for the two constraints (1) and (2) in the value function, we obtain:
The first order condition with respect to t ϕ and the envelope theorem allow to derive an expression for the optimal path of the control variable 12 :
Since we have a linear-quadratic structure in the stochastic control problem the solution will be of the form:
Thus the optimal control will be linear function of the state variable (see Walsh, 1998) . Updating one period ahead and taking expectations at time t of Eq. (13) yields:
Substitution of Eqs. (13), (14) in Eq. (12) yields the following quadratic equation, whose solution gives the optimal c value:
The solution that we accept should satisfy the inflation process stability criterion. This condition implies that only the negative c-root is accepted 13 . Finally, we manage to obtain the optimal path for the interest rate using Eqs. (9) and (13) [ ] , are the respective interest rate weights on inflation, output and asset price misalignments from fundamentals. The 'Taylor principle' implies that the inflation coefficient, f π , should exceed the value of one, to ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower inflation 14 .
Analysis of the results
The rule for adjusting nominal interest rates shown in Eqs. (16) and (18), signifies a fundamental new result in the interest rates rules literature, since we show that the central bank should not only take into consideration inflation and output when setting interest rates, but should also react to asset price misalignments. Bean (2003) also assumes a wealth effects augmented demand curve in his analysis, but the results that he obtains for optimal policy differ significantly from the ones presented in this section. In particular, Bean finds no role for asset prices in the commitment and discretionary equilibrium. Bean's optimality conditions contain neither the policy instrument, nor anything to do with the demand side of the economy.
In our results, however, the aggressiveness of the reaction to asset price misalignments f − = ) promotes overall macroeconomic stability. Such a pro-active response has also been advocated by Cecchetti et al (2000) using the Bernake and Gertler (1999) new keynesian sticky wages -financial accelerator model.
A common feature in the aforementioned studies is that they assume, rather than derive, a rule for interest rate setting and then examine the effects on macroeconomic volatility from reacting or not reacting to asset prices. Our main focus however, was to show that in the context of optimal central bank behavior, asset price misalignments should be an element in the monetary authority's feedback rule. Hence, this paper extends the literature that obtains analytical expressions for interest rates based upon optimization of the central banks' objectives. The augmented Taylor rule depicted by Eq. (18) points out explicitly that the financial and real instability associated with growing financial imbalances should not be tolerated by the central bank.
It is easy to show that the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) Second, if markets are efficient and actual asset prices are always equal to their intrinsic value, i.e. b = 0, there is no direct monetary policy reaction to asset prices. In this case, monetary policy takes into account asset prices, indirectly and with a lag, via their demand wealth effects.
Considering, however, the empirical evidence in Section 2.1, EMH does not appear to hold since b > 0. This implies that a positive weight should be applied to asset price misalignments. 15 The policy rule in Eq. (19) is an direct explicit instrument rule since it provides a formula for the setting of policy instrument that specifies feedback only from predetermined target variables ( , In order to further examine the impact of asset prices on the interest rate setting behavior of the central bank, we calculate the elasticity of the reaction coefficients in Eq. (18) with respect to the magnitude of wealth effects, 3
β . The results, presented in Table 2 bellow, lead to Propositions 1 to 3.
[ Thus, when the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken into account, the magnitude of the inflation related-interest rate adjustment should be smaller. This does not imply that the Central Bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, if the true data generation process for aggregate demand is given by the augmented IS, Eq. (2), then monetary policy may have to be more frequently adjusted. Proposition 1 suggests that as wealth effects build up, a too aggressive interest rate response to inflation will lead to recession and will threaten the price stability objective. In addition, Proposition 2 calls for a less pronounced response to the output gap in the presence of significant correlation between asset prices and aggregate demand. The intuition and policy implications of Propositions 1 and 2 become clearer when considered in combination with Proposition 3. In essence, if aggregate demand is affected by the evolution of asset prices then monetary authorities should include asset price misalignments in their optimal feedback rule and there should be a change in the distribution of the relevant interest rate weights. Particularly, the interest rate weight on inflation and output decreases while the weight attached to asset price misalignments increases. This allows asset prices to be considered as an element of the authorities' reaction function without necessarily implying overall tighter, than before, policy since the response to inflation and output will be less aggressive. In other words, our optimal analysis results imply that first, asset price misalignments should have an independent role and not only be considered as instruments to help forecast output and inflation; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of reaction, away from the traditional variables, i.e. inflation and the output gap, and towards a direct response to financial imbalances.
Conclusions
Although there is still no widespread agreement among economists on whether central banks should explicitly target asset price inflation, in addition to conventional consumer price targets, a vast consensus that emerges states that the financial-market channel plays an important role in the transmission of the monetary policy. Our aim in this paper is to examine how the conduct of monetary policy is affected by the dynamic evolution of asset prices. Starting from these considerations, we build a backward-looking structural macro model where asset price fluctuations have an impact on aggregate demand and consequently on inflation. A crucial property of our model is that the asset market is not necessarily efficient, thereby generating deviations between actual asset prices and their fundamental value. In order to construct the optimal interest rate rule, we assume that the central bank solves a stochastic control problem to minimise intertemporally the variance of the output gap and inflation.
The derived optimal policy rule conditions the monetary policy instrument not only on inflation and demand pressures, as standard in the Taylor 1 Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(4) autocorrelation. Two-stage least squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting matrix. 2 The instruments used are a constant and lags 1 to 6 of the change in: nominal short term interest rates, inflation, output gap, and real stock prices. 3 J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 4 *, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
TABLES

APPENDIX
Appendix A1
The first order condition that yields the optimal response is: 
